The Problem Stated
a. God
has a concept of good.
b. This
concept has a normative effect insofar as he prescribes moral guidelines to his
creatures based on this notion.
c. But
the very existence of this notion raises a question.
i. Does
God decide what is good?
OR
ii. Does
God recommend what is already good?
·
Both of these views present a problem for belief
in divinities in general, but the focus of this work will be towards the
problem as it pertains to the Christian faith. God, as understood in the
biblical sense, is a benevolent being and therefore, his actions must be
understood as being good. This
“dilemma” questions the origins of this good.
·
If one accepts premise i., the good is by definition arbitrary. If God simply constitutes what is good and what is bad,
there is nothing substantive keeping God from appointing rape, for example, as
a moral act. (If he appealed to some other sense of good, premise ii. would hold, not i.) Thus, if God did
constitute rape as morally good, we would be morally obligated to perform such
acts and failure to do so would be classified as sin. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to claim that God simply
decides what good is.
·
Similarly, accepting premise ii. as veridical also presents
problems. Operating on St.
Anselm’s’ definition of God as “a being than which nothing greater can be
conceived”, God is necessarily the
greatest being possible.
Therefore, it necessarily follows that there is nothing greater than God. However, if God recommends what is already good,
he is appealing to something other and higher than himself, thus invalidating
this definition. So if one wishes
accepts premise ii. God is not a
supreme force.
·
Opponents to theism claim that this “dilemma”
makes belief in God extremely problematic. If this claim were a true dilemma, I would be inclined to
agree. But it is a
misunderstanding of logic to view this argument as a true dilemma. Presenting an argument as only having
(in this case) two options, when in all actuality there are more, is a logical
fallacy (a false dilemma). For example, if I say “If the
coffee isn’t cold, then it’s hot.” I am guilty of presenting a false
dilemma. It is entirely possible
for the coffee to be lukewarm, thus making it neither cold nor hot. Therefore, since a third option exists,
it is not a true dilemma. That being considered, what could be a possible third
option for Euthyphro’s Dilemma?
·
The third option I will consider is this
i.
Good is an attribute of God.
·
Many people have presented a similar premise by
saying “Good is apart of God’s nature.
The problem with this theory is that it is ambiguous and it only backs
up the dilemma one step. The
question then changes to “Does God’s nature decide what is good and bad, or does
it recommend what is already good?”
Although this is option is headed in the right direction, it does not
solve the problem.
·
BUT, if the theory of nature fails, how does
making good an attribute solve the dilemma? To get to the crux of the matter, a
few premises must be presented and considered.
a.
God is eternal.
i. That
is, God has always existed. Therefore, he was not created (not even
self-created).
b.
God is unchanging.
i. For
imperfection presupposes change.
If God needed to change, he would be either less perfect before or after
the change. There are not
differing levels of perfection.
Therefore, if God is eternally
perfect (which we will accept for the sake of argument) he must be eternally unchanging, i.e., constant.
c.
Thus, if God is eternally unchanging, his
attributes are unchanging as well.
d.
Additionally, if God is unchanging and was not
created (not even by himself) he cannot, in a sense, control his attributes.
Conclusion
If premise d. holds, (and I understand that every Christian
will not accept this, seeing as some believe that God can do any and
everything. This however is an unbiblical and illogical assumption, but it is a
different discussion that I will not go into now.) God does not have control of
his attributes, seeing that they are eternal and unchanging. Therefore, if God
has no control of his attributes, he does not constitute what good is (although
it is a part of his nature) and he does not appeal to something outside of himself
for his concept of good. This leaves
the dilemma presented with a possible third option, thus rendering it a false
dilemma.
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